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Grand March to begin at PM. Come at to organize your dance card! Appetizers and Desserts will be served throughout the evening. Sue Pfeiffer can be contacted at: or spfeiffer acpl. Or videos on YouTube! Another way to reserve your tickets for the ball is on the facebook site If you attend the Ball, please send pics to sls yahoo.

Library of Congress

The largest, nationally recognized, juried show in the Midwest devoted to pre original or reproduction living history supplies, accouterments and related crafts. Will be fighting with the Western Rifles Group out of Illinois.

Saturday battle is Chickamauga so repeaters and muskets are welcome. Sunday is the Battle of Belmont Missouri. On April 1, Banks lunged forward, advancing to Woodstock along Stony Creek, where he once again was delayed by supply problems. Banks advanced again on April 16, surprising Ashby's cavalry by fording Stony Creek at a place they had neglected to picket, capturing 60 of the horsemen, while the remainder of Ashby's command fought their way back to Jackson's position on Rude's Hill.

Jackson assumed that Banks had been reinforced, so he abandoned his position and marched quickly up the Valley to Harrisonburg on April Banks occupied New Market and crossed Massanutten Mountain to seize the bridges across the South Fork in the Luray Valley, once again besting Ashby's cavalry, who failed to destroy the bridges in time. Banks now controlled the valley as far south as Harrisonburg. Though Banks was aware of Jackson's location, he misinterpreted Jackson's intent, thinking that Jackson was heading east of the Blue Ridge to aid Richmond.

Without clear direction from Washington as to his next objective, Banks proposed his force also be sent east of the Blue Ridge, telling his superiors that "such [an] order would electrify our force. Banks was then instructed to retreat down the valley and assume a defensive position at Strasburg. Johnston had relocated most of his army for the direct protection of Richmond, leaving Jackson's force isolated.

Seven Days Battles

Johnston sent new orders to Jackson, instructing him to prevent Banks from seizing Staunton and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, reinforcing him with the 8,man division under Maj. Ewell , left behind at Brandy Station. Jackson, at a strong defensive position on Rude's Hill, corresponded with Ewell to develop a strategy for the campaign. During this period, Jackson also faced difficulty within his own command.

He arrested Garnett and had a nasty confrontation with Turner Ashby in which Jackson displayed his displeasure at Ashby's performance by stripping him of 10 of his 21 cavalry companies and reassigning them to Charles S. Winder, Garnett's replacement in command of the Stonewall Brigade. Winder mediated between the two officers and the stubborn Jackson uncharacteristically backed down, restoring Ashby's command. More importantly, Jackson received an April 21 letter from Gen.

Lee , military adviser to President Jefferson Davis , requesting that he and Ewell attack Banks to reduce the threat against Richmond that was being posed by McDowell at Fredericksburg. Jackson's plan was to have Ewell's division move into position at Swift Run Gap to threaten Banks's flank, while Jackson's force marched toward the Allegheny Mountains to assist the detached 2, men under Brig.

Edward "Allegheny" Johnson , who were resisting the advance toward Staunton of Brig. Milroy, the leading element of Maj. Jackson marched south to the town of Port Republic in heavy rains and on May 2, turned his men east in the direction of Charlottesville and began marching over the Blue Ridge.

To the surprise of his men and officers, whom Jackson habitually left in the dark as to his intentions, on May 4 they boarded trains that were heading west, not east toward Richmond, as they had anticipated. The movement to the east had been a clever deception. On May 5, Jackson's army camped around Staunton, about 6 miles from Johnson's command. On May 7, Milroy received intelligence that Jackson and Johnson were combining against him and he began to fall back toward the Alleghenies.

Ohio Regimental Files

The Union force of about 6, under Milroy and Schenck was camped in the village to the west side of the Bullpasture River. Overlooking the scene was a spur of Bullpasture Mountain known as Sitlington Hill, a mile-long plateau that could potentially dominate the Union position.

However, there were two disadvantages: the single trail that reached the summit was so difficult that artillery could not be deployed there, and the rugged terrain—densely forested, steep slopes and ravines—offered opportunities for Union attackers to climb the feet to the summit without being subjected to constant Confederate fire.

The Union generals realized that they were outnumbered by the 10, men that Jackson and Johnson commanded and that their men would be particularly vulnerable to artillery fire from Sitlington Hill. They did not realize that Jackson could not bring up his artillery.

Therefore, in order to buy time for their troops to withdraw at night, Milroy recommended a preemptive assault on the hill and Schenck, his superior officer, approved. Their initial assault almost broke Johnson's right, but Jackson sent up Taliaferro's infantry and repulsed the Federals.

Correspondence

The next attack was at the vulnerable center of the Confederate line, where the 12th Georgia Infantry occupied a salient that was subjected to fire from both sides. The Georgians, the only non-Virginians on the Confederate side, proudly and defiantly refused to withdraw to a more defensible position and took heavy casualties as they stood and fired, silhouetted against the bright sky as easy targets at the crest of the hill.

One Georgia private exclaimed, "We did not come all this way to Virginia to run before Yankees. Johnson was wounded and Taliaferro assumed command of the battle while Jackson brought up additional reinforcements. The fighting continued until about 10 p. Jackson attempted to pursue, but by the time his men started the Federals were already 13 miles away. On a high ridge overlooking the road to Franklin , Schenck took up a defensive position and Jackson did not attempt to attack him. Union casualties were 34 killed, wounded, 5 missing , Confederate killed, wounded, 4 missing , one of the rare cases in the Civil War where the attacker lost fewer men than the defender.

On May 13 Jackson ordered Ewell to pursue Banks if he withdrew down the Valley from Strasburg, whereas Johnston had ordered Ewell to leave the Valley and return to the army protecting Richmond if Banks moved eastward to join McDowell at Fredericksburg.

Since Shields's division was reported to have left the Valley, Ewell was in a quandary about which orders to follow. He met in person with Jackson on May 18 at Mount Solon and the two generals decided that while in the Valley, Ewell reported operationally to Jackson, and that a prime opportunity existed to attack Banks's army, now depleted to fewer than 10, men, with their combined forces. When subsequent peremptory orders came to Ewell from Johnston to abandon this idea and march to Richmond, Jackson was forced to telegraph for help from Robert E.

Lee, who convinced President Davis that a potential victory in the Valley had more immediate importance than countering Shields. Johnston modified his orders to Ewell: "The object you have to accomplish is the prevention of the junction of General Banks's troops and those of General McDowell's.

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April –November - The Civil War in America | Exhibitions - Library of Congress

Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent Ashby's cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, where Banks began to be concerned that his 4, infantry, 1, cavalry, and 16 artillery pieces might be insufficient to withstand Jackson's 16, men.


  • Friedrich der Große: Musiker und Monarch (German Edition).
  • GRAIN FREE COOKING!!
  • Dispatches from the Civil War!
  • Correspondence.
  • Jackson's Valley campaign!

However, Jackson's plan was first to defeat the small Federal outpost at Front Royal about 1, men of the 1st Maryland Infantry under Col. John R. Kenly , a turning movement that would make the Strasburg position untenable. Early on May 23, Turner Ashby and a detachment of cavalry forded the South Fork of the Shenandoah River and rode northwest to capture a Union depot and railroad trestle at Buckton Station. Two companies of Union infantry defended the structures briefly, but the Confederates prevailed and burned the building, tore up railroad track, and cut the telegraph wires, isolating Front Royal from Banks at Strasburg.

Meanwhile, Jackson led his infantry on a detour over a path named Gooney Manor Road to skirt the reach of Federal guns on his approach to Front Royal. From a ridge south of town, Jackson observed that the Federals were camped near the confluence of the South and North Forks and that they would have to cross two bridges in order to escape from his pending attack. The center of Jackson's line of battle was the ferocious Louisiana Tigers battalion men, part of Brig.

Richard Taylor's brigade in Ewell's division , commanded by Col. The first shots were fired around 2 p. Kenly and his men made a stand on a hill just north of town and Jackson prepared to charge them with the Marylanders in the center and the Louisianians against their left flank. Before the attack could commence, Kenly saw Confederate cavalry approaching the bridges that he needed for his escape route and he immediately ordered his men to abandon their position.

They first crossed the South Fork bridges and then the wooden Pike Bridge over the North Fork, which they set afire behind them. Taylor's Brigade raced in pursuit and Jackson ordered them to cross the burning bridge. As he saw the Federals escaping, Jackson was frustrated that he had no artillery to fire at them.

His guns were delayed on the Gooney Manor Road detour route the infantry had taken and Ashby's cavalry had failed to deliver Jackson's orders for them to take the direct route after the battle started. Banks , speaking to Col. Gordon , May 24, [34]. A detachment of Confederate cavalry under Col. Flournoy of the 6th Virginia Cavalry arrived at that moment and Jackson set them off in pursuit of Kenly.

The retreating Union troops were forced to halt and make a stand at Cedarville.

Although the cavalrymen were outnumbered three to one, they charged the Union line, which broke but reformed. A second charge routed the Union detachment. Union casualties were , of which were captured.